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Abstract—Answer set programming (ASP) and possibility
theory can be combined to form possibilistic answer set pro-
gramming (PASP), a framework for non-monotonic reasoning
under uncertainty. Existing proposals view answer sets of PASP
programs as weighted epistemic states, in which the strength
by which different literals are believed to hold may vary.
In contrast, in this paper we propose an approach in which
epistemic states remain Boolean, but some epistemic states may
be considered more plausible than others. A PASP program
is then a representation of an incomplete description of these
epistemic states where certainties are associated with each rule
which is interpreted in terms of a necessity measure. The main
contribution of this paper is the introduction of a new semantics
for PASP as well as a study of the resulting complexity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Answer Set Programming (ASP) is a form of declarative
programming which is based on the notion of a stable model.
A rule such as (beach ← sunny , hot) intuitively encodes that
when it is sunny and hot, we want to go to the beach. ASP also
allows us to reason about incomplete information by means of
negation-as-failure (NAF). The slightly altered rule (beach ←
sunny , hot , not crowded ) intuitively encodes that we go to
the beach when it is sunny and hot, unless we have reasons
to believe that it is crowded. Of particular interest is that our
conclusion may change over time, i.e. we may need to revise
our conclusions, as NAF is a non-monotonic operator. Indeed,
if we are underway to the beach and we hear on the radio that
it is crowded at the beach, we would no longer be inclined to
go.
While ASP can deal with incomplete information, it does
not provide a mechanism to express that some rules or facts are
more certain than others. Possibilistic ASP (PASP) combines
ASP with possibility theory, a popular formalism for dealing
with uncertainty, by associating a certainty degree with each
rule. We are then not only interested in finding out whether or
not we can, for example, derive ‘beach’, but also with what
certainty we can derive it. For programs without NAF, the
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certainty with which we can derive the consequent is given
by the weakest information needed to derive the conclusion.
Thus it is limited by the certainty of either the rule itself
or by the certainties of the components that make up the
antecedent. Indeed, if we only know with little certainty
that it will be hot, then we will have little certainty that
we will actually go to the beach. When we consider NAF,
however, there are different ways to deal with the uncertainty
attached to each rule. One possibility is to rely on the classical
semantics of ASP to determine the reduct (i.e. we assume
that the program is a classical program, without certainties)
and take the certainties into account for the resulting simple
program [1]. Such an approach has the benefit of staying close
to the classical semantics of ASP. Alternatively, we may also
choose to interpret ‘not a’ as the degree to which we are
not able to derive the conclusion ‘a’ with certainty [2]. Then
PASP coincides with a particular multi-valued semantics [3],
although for programs that allow disjunctive consequents there
may be differences [4].
This paper explores another interpretation of PASP pro-
grams in which we consider a PASP program as an incomplete
specification of a classical ASP program. In other words:
we express our certainty in whether or not specific rules in
the program are valid and thus whether or not those rules
should be taken under consideration to derive conclusions. The
intuition of our semantics is then that literals can be seen as
plausible consequences of a program, even if they can only
be derived when a particular subset of the rules is considered.
Clearly, the higher the certainty of the rules that need to be
omitted, the lower the plausibility of the literals that can be
derived from them. Conversely, a literal can only be considered
as a necessary consequence if we can still derive it when some
of the less certain rules are omitted.
As a running example, consider the following problem
setting. The weather report indicates that there is a slight
chance of rain (rain). As long as it is not raining, we are
rather likely to go to the beach (beach) or, somewhat less
likely, to have a barbecue (bbq) due to time constraints. We
cannot have both, as you are not allowed to have a barbecue
on the beach. This can intuitively be encoded as the program
Pex with the rules
0.2 : rain←
0.8 : beach← not bbq, not rain
0.6 : bbq ← not beach, not rain
1 : ← bbq, beach.
Intuitively, considering the problem setting, we desire an
answer such that it is clear that going to the beach is preferred
to having a barbecue. However, as we will see in more detail
throughout this paper, the semantics from [1] and [2] are
unable to arrive at this conclusion.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II we provide the reader with some notions from
answer set programming, possibility theory and possibilistic
answer set programming. In Section III we propose our
new semantics for possibilistic answer set programming. The
complexity results of some of the main reasoning tasks of
these semantics are discussed in Section IV. Related work is
discussed in Section V and we formulate our conclusions in
Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We start by reviewing the definitions of answer set pro-
gramming and possibility theory that will be used in the
remainder of the paper. We also review existing approaches
to possibilistic answer set programming.
A. Answer Set Programs (ASP)
Answer set programming is a form of declarative program-
ming. To define the syntax of ASP [5], we start from a
finite set of atoms A. A literal is either an atom ‘a’ or its
classical negation ‘¬a’. A naf-literal is either a literal ‘l’ or
a literal ‘l’ preceded by not, which we call the negation-
as-failure (NAF) operator. Intuitively, we have that ‘not l’
is true when we cannot prove ‘l’. An expression of the
form l0 ← l1, ..., lm, not lm+1, ..., not ln with li a literal
for 0 ≤ i ≤ n is called a normal rule. We call l0 the
head of the rule and l1, ..., lm, not lm+1, ..., not ln the body.
Whenever a normal rule does not contain NAF, i.e. when
n = m, we say that the rule is a simple rule. A rule
of the form l0 ← is called a fact and is a shorthand for
l0 ← > where > denotes tautology. A rule of the form
← l1, ..., lm, not lm+1, ..., not ln is called a constraint and
is a shorthand for ⊥ ← l1, ..., lm, not lm+1, ..., not ln where
⊥ denotes contradiction. A normal (resp. simple) program P
is a set of normal (resp. simple) rules.
The semantics of ASP are defined as follows. The set of
literals that are relevant for a normal program P are defined
as AP = (BP ∪¬BP ) with BP the set of atoms appearing in
program P and ¬BP = {¬a | a ∈ BP }. An interpretation I
of P is any set of literals I ⊆ AP . A consistent interpretation
I is an interpretation I that does not contain both a and ¬a
for some a ∈ BP . An interpretation I is said to be a model
of a simple rule of the form l0 ← l1, ..., lm if l0 ∈ I or
{l1, ..., lm} 6⊆ I . An interpretation I of a simple program P is
a model of P either if I is consistent and for every rule r ∈ P
we have that I is a model of r, or, if I = AP . We say that
a model I is an answer set of the simple program P when I
is the minimal model w.r.t. set inclusion of P . The reduct [5]
P I of a normal program P w.r.t. an interpretation I is defined
as
P I = {l0 ← l1, ..., lm | {lm+1, ..., ln} ∩ I = ∅
∧ (l0 ← l1, ..., lm, not lm+1, ..., not ln) ∈ P}.
We say that I is an answer set (or stable model) of the normal
program P when I is an answer set of the simple program P I .
When a program P has the answer set AP , then this is the
unique answer set [6] and we say that P is an inconsistent
program. Two important reasoning tasks in ASP are brave
and cautious reasoning, i.e. finding whether a literal is true
in at least one or in all answer sets of a program P . We use
|=b (resp. |=c) to denote brave (resp. cautious) inference in
classical ASP.
B. Possibility Theory
Possibility theory is a formalism for dealing with incomplete
and uncertain information [7]. Let x be a variable taking its
value from the universe U . A possibility distribution pi is an
U → [0, 1] mapping that encodes for each value u ∈ U to
what extent it is possible that u is the actual value assigned to
x [7]. By convention, pi(u) = 0 means that u is impossible and
pi(u) = 1 means that no available information prevents u from
being the actual value. In other words: pi(u) expresses to what
degree we would not be surprised to learn that the actual value
is u [8]. Possibility degrees are mainly interpreted qualita-
tively, i.e. when pi(u) > pi(u′), u is considered more plausible
than u′. A possibility distribution pi is said to be normalized if
∃u ∈ U · pi(u) = 1, i.e. at least one value is entirely possible.
A possibility distribution pi induces two uncertainty measures
that allow us to rank sets of values A ⊆ U . The possibility
measure Π is defined by Π(A) = max {pi(u) | u ∈ A} and
evaluates to what extent there is at least one element in A
that is a possible value of x. The dual necessity measure N is
defined by N(A) = 1−Π(U \A) and evaluates to what extent
the values outside of A are impossible (or, for normalized
possibility distributions, to what extent we can be certain that
x is a value in A).
C. Possibilistic ASP (PASP)
PASP combines ASP and possibility theory by associating
a necessity degree with rules. We use the name PASP for a
family of approaches that share a common syntax and which
all rely on possibility theory. A number of semantics for
PASP exist [1], [2], each with their own underlying intuition.
These semantics, in general, do not agree, unless we restrict
ourselves to simple programs. The semantics which we will
discuss both start from a generalization of the concept of
an interpretation. In classical ASP, an interpretation can be
seen as a mapping I : AP → {0, 1}, i.e. a literal l ∈ AP
is either true or false. This notion is generalized in PASP
to a valuation, which is a function V : AP → [0, 1]. The
underlying intuition of V (l) = c is that we can derive the
literal l (or, more precisely, that l is true) with certainty ‘c’.
For notational convenience, the set notation V = {lc, . . .} is
also used. A possibilistic normal (resp. simple) program is a
set of pairs p = (r, c), with r a normal (resp. simple) rule and
c ∈ [0, 1] a certainty associated with r, which we will also
write as c : l0 ← l1, ..., lm, not lm+1, ..., not ln. Intuitively,
the certainty c attached to a rule expresses to what degree we
are certain that the rule is indeed true. For a possibilistic rule
p = (r, c) we use p∗ to denote r (i.e. the classical rule obtained
by ignoring the certainty) and for a possibilistic program P
we use P ∗ to denote the set of rules {p∗ | p ∈ P}.
For simplicity, we will only present the main intuitions of
the PASP semantics proposed by Nicolas et al. [1] and Bauters
et al. [2]. Consider the possibilistic simple program
0.5 : a← 0.8 : b← 0.9 : a← b.
The unique possibilistic answer set of this program is{
a0.8, b0.8
}
. Indeed, clearly we can derive a0.5 and b0.8 as
these are given as facts. Using the last rule, with a certainty
of 0.9, we can further strengthen our conclusion. The weakest
point of information, however, is that we are only able to
derive ‘b’ with a certainty of 0.8. Hence we can only derive
‘a’ with a certainty of min(0.8, 0.9) = 0.8.
The semantics from Nicolas [1] for a possibilistic normal
program are intuitively obtained by ignoring the certainties
associated with the rules, determining the classical reduct and
then re-associating the certainty degrees with the rules in the
reduct. This ensures that there is a 1-on-1 relation between
possibilistic answer sets and classical answer sets. Consider
the possibilistic normal program
1 : lost ← not visible
1 : visible ← not hidden
0.5 : hidden ← .
This program describes a very simple hiding game. The agent
that plays this game will either see the desired item or the
item will be hidden (yet we are unsure as to whether the item
is actually hidden). When the item is not hidden it is visible
and when the item is not visible the agent loses. The unique
answer set of the classical program obtained by removing the
weights is {hidden, lost} and the unique possibilistic answer
set, according to the semantics from [1], is
{
hidden0.5, lost1
}
.
While for this example we have a unique possibilistic answer
set, in general a possibilistic normal program may have
multiple possibilistic answer sets. If we look at the possibilistic
answer sets obtained under the semantics from [1], then these
are rather restrictive: even though we are unsure as to whether
or not the object is hidden, we conclude with absolute certainty
that the agent has lost the game. This can also be seen in the
program Pex from Section I. The only classical answer set
of this program is {rain} and the corresponding possibilistic
answer set is
{
rain0.2
}
. The semantics from [1] are thus
unable to help us choose being going to the beach or having
a barbecue.
The semantics from [2] identify an answer set with a
possibility distribution over propositional interpretations. A
rule is seen as a constraint on possibility distributions where,
intuitively, an answer set corresponds to an epistemic state, in
which literals may be more or less certain to hold, and rules
are used to reason about which epistemic states are possible,
i.e. answer set programming is seen as a form of meta-
epistemic reasoning [9]. As in classical ASP, there may be a
number of possibility distributions that agree with these con-
straints (i.e. we may have multiple models). The possibilistic
answer sets are then defined as the valuations that correspond
with the least specific1 possibility distribution (i.e. the one that
corresponds with the notion of a minimal model in classic
ASP). For the normal program mentioned above, the unique
possibilistic answer set is
{
hidden0.5, visible0.5, lost0.5
}
. This
conclusion adheres to a different intuition: we are not entirely
certain whether the item is hidden, so we are not entirely
certain as to whether it is visible nor as to whether the
agent has lost the game. If we take a look at the program
Pex from Section I, then we do not obtain an answer set.
Once again, it does not help us in determining whether we
should go to the beach or have a barbecue. The underlying
cause of this result can be uncovered if we drop the last rule
from Pex, since then we would obtain an infinite family of
answer sets of the form
{
beachc, bbqc
′}
such that c+ c′ = 1,
c ∈ [0.4, 0.8] and c′ ∈ [0.2, 0.6]. Indeed, under the semantics
of [2] the idea is that ‘not a’ is certain to the extent that ¬a
is possible. This idea makes sense in this example if we want
to evaluate ‘not rain’. However, the occurrences of not bbq
and not beach encode that we want to make a choice between
two alternatives (provided that it does not rain). This, however,
cannot (easily) be expressed under the semantics from [2].
III. SEMANTICS OF UNCERTAIN RULES
To arrive at our new semantics for PASP, we start by looking
at the intuition of classical ASP. A classical answer set can
be seen as an epistemic state, i.e. an answer set determines
what an agents knows at a given time. We can reason over
which are the possible epistemic states (or answer sets) of an
agent using an answer set program. There are several ways
in which this view can be refined when certainty scores are
attached to rules. Under the semantics from e.g. [2], crisp
epistemic states are no longer considered but rather we allow
weighted epistemic states, i.e. we let an agent be more or less
certain about specific literals.
We can, however, look at these certainties in another way.
Rather than considering weighted epistemic states, we can use
Boolean epistemic states and use the certainties associated
with the rules to express that some epistemic states are more
plausible than others. It is clear that considering an invalid
1The possibility distribution pi that makes minimal commitments. Formally,
let pi1 and pi2 be two possibility distributions with the same universe U . We
write pi1 ≥ pi2 when ∀u ∈ U ·pi1(u) ≥ pi2(u). The least specific possibility
distribution in a set, if it exists, is the greatest element w.r.t. ≥.
rule may result in incorrect conclusions. Yet, since ASP is
non-monotonic, omitting valid information may also allow us
to derive additional, erroneous conclusions. Hence, to consider
all the possible epistemic states, we need to consider both the
answer sets of subprograms of a given program (to find out
what should be derived if particular rules of the program were
wrong) as well as the answer sets of the program itself, as
answer sets of subprograms are not necessarily answer sets of
the complete program and vice versa. An answer set is then
necessary when it is an answer set of the complete program
and when it remains an answer set of all the subprograms
from which we have removed uncertain rules. An answer
set is possible whenever it is an answer set of the complete
program or of a subprogram obtained by removing uncertain
rules. Specifically, we can assign a degree of possibility to
each subprogram P ′, which in turn corresponds with an ASP
program of which the answer sets may or may not model
the epistemic state of the agent in a correct way (as we
may have erroneously omitted a valid rule or included an
invalid rule). Thus, rather than having a possibility distribution
over propositional interpretations we conceptually need a
possibility distribution over subprograms P ′ ⊆ P . While there
are exponentially many such subprograms, we can encode this
possibility distribution by associating a certainty with each rule
in our program P .
In particular, a possibilistic rule (r, c) is interpreted
as the statement N(r) ≥ c where N(r) stands for
N({P ′ | P ′ ⊆ P and P ′ contains the rule r}), which is
analogous to how propositional formulas are interpreted in
possibilistic logic [10]. The possibility distribution piP is then
the least specific possibility distribution that satisfies these
constraints. A program is considered possible to the extent
that it contains all of the certain rules.
Definition 1. Let P be a possibilistic ASP program. We define
the possibility distribution piP over the subsets P ′ ⊆ P . We
then have that piP (P ′) is given by{
1−max {c | (c : r) ∈ P \ P ′} when P ′∗ consistent
0 otherwise
It is not hard to see that this corresponds with the least
specific possibility distribution that satisfies the constraints,
as well as the additional constraint that inconsistent programs
are impossible. Furthermore, notice how piP is a normalized
possibility distribution whenever P ∗ is consistent since then
piP (P ) = 1. Intuitively, this definition states that the less
certain the rules are that we omit from the subprogram P ′,
the more possible it is that P ′ is the correct program.
Now we can define brave and cautious reasoning for PASP
programs. Contrary to classical ASP, we not only have answer
sets of the complete program P but we also have answer sets
for each subprogram P ′ ⊂ P , for which we also need to
take the possibilities into account. Hence we can consider the
degree to which a literal is, necessarily or possibly, a brave
or cautious consequence of P . This results in a total of four
different types of inference.
Definition 2. Let P be a possibilistic ASP program. Let piP
be as in Definition 1. The degree to which it is possible that
‘l’ is a brave/cautious consequence of P is defined as:
Π
(
P |=b l) = max{piP (P ′) | P ′ ⊆ P and P ′∗ |=b l}
Π (P |=c l) = max{piP (P ′) | P ′ ⊆ P and P ′∗ |=c l}
i.e. this is the degree to which some program P ′ ⊆ P
is possible which has ‘l’ as a brave/cautious consequence.
The degree to which it is necessary that P has ‘l’ as a
brave/cautious consequence is defined as:
N
(
P |=b l) = 1−max{piP (P ′) | P ′ ⊆ P and P ′∗ 6|=b l}
N (P |=c l) = 1−max{piP (P ′) | P ′ ⊆ P and P ′∗ 6|=c l} .
Note that this is the degree to which all programs P ′ ⊆ P that
do not have ‘l’ as a brave/cautious consequence are impossible.
In the following, we will write P |=bΠ lλ to denote that
Π
(
P |=b l) ≥ λ, and similar for the notations P |=cΠ lλ,
P |=bN lλ and P |=cN lλ.
We can now define the possibility degree of an answer set.
Each subprogram P ′ ⊆ P may, by itself, have one or more
answer sets. At the same time, two subprograms P ′ ⊆ P and
P ′′ ⊆ P may have the same answer set, even if piP (P ′) 6=
piP (P
′′). This leads to the following definition.
Definition 3. Let P be a possibilistic ASP program. Let piP be
the possibility distribution over the subsets P ′ ⊆ P . We define
the possibility distribution piA over the interpretations M :
piA(M) = max
{
piP (P
′) |M is an answer set of P ′∗}
Note that piA(M) = 0 when M is not an answer set of any
subprogram P ′ ⊆ P .
Recall that we look at ASP as a form of meta-epistemic
reasoning, where one of the answer sets of the program or
any of it subprograms corresponds with the actual epistemic
state of the agent. We have:
Definition 4. Let piA be the possibility distribution over
the interpretations M . The possibility that l is a literal
in the epistemic state of the agent is given by Π(l) =
max {piA(M) | l ∈M}. The necessity that l is a literal in
the epistemic state of the agent is given by N(l) = 1 −
max {piA(M) | l /∈M}.
We then have that Π(l) = Π
(
P |=b l). Indeed, this readily
follows from Definition 2 since P ′∗ |=b l is equivalent to
stating that there is some answer set M of P ′∗ with l ∈ M .
Similarly we have N(l) = N (P |=c l). These two new
forms of reasoning thus correspond with two of the forms
of reasoning from Definition 2. We now present a number of
examples that highlight the proposed semantics.
Example 1. Consider the PASP program P with the rules:
0.8 : b← not c 0.3 : c← d, not b 0.9 : d← .
We have that
piP (P ) = 1 {b, d} , {c, d}
piP (0.8 : b← not c;0.9 : d←) = 0.7 {b, d}
piP (0.3 : c← d, not b;0.9 : d←) = 0.2 {c, d}
piP (0.9 : d←) = 0.2 {d}
piP (0.8 : b← not c;0.3 : c← d, not b) = 0.1 {b}
piP (0.8 : b← not c) = 0.1 {b}
piP (0.3 : c← d, not b) = 0.1 {}
piP ({}) = 0.1 {}.
where the possibility associated with the subprogram is shown
on the left and the unique classical answer set of the subpro-
gram is shown on the right. We can verify that we obtain the
following conclusions:
P |=bN
{
b0.8, c0.3, d0.9
}
P |=cN
{
b0, c0, d0.9
}
P |=bΠ
{
b1, c1, d1
}
P |=cΠ
{
b0.7, c0.2, d1
}
.
It readily follows that Π(b) = 1,Π(c) = 1 and Π(d) = 1 and
N(b) = 0, N(c) = 0 and N(d) = 0.9. The different semantics
for PASP do not necessarily agree with each other, as illus-
trated in the next example.
Example 2. Consider the PASP program P from Section II
with the rules:
1 : lost ← not visible
1 : visible ← not hidden
0.5 : hidden ←
For brevity, we name these rules from top to bottom r1, r2
and r3. We have that
piP (P ) = 1 {hidden, lost}
piP (r1, r2) = 0.5 {visible}
whereas the possibility of all the other subprograms P ′ ⊆
P is 0. Since each subprogram has a unique answer set, we
have that brave and cautious reasoning coincide. The cautious
conclusions that we obtain are:
P |=cN
{
hidden0.5, visible0, lost0.5
}
P |=cΠ
{
hidden1, visible0.5, lost1
}
.
These conclusions do not agree with either the semantics
from [1] or [2], yet provide an intuitively satisfiable answer
to the outcome of the game that the agent plays. Indeed, we
can conclude that it is entirely possible that the agent has lost
(since P |=cΠ lost1), while at the same time we know that this
is not necessarily so (since P |=cN lost0.5).
It is furthermore easy to verify that the new semantics are a
proper extension of classical ASP, i.e. when we assume that
each rule is totally certain we recover the classical answer sets.
Example 3. Consider the PASP program P with the set of
rules {1 : a← not b,1 : b← not a}. We have that
piP (P ) = 1 {a} , {b}
whereas the possibility of all the others subprogram P ′ ⊆ P is
0. In this example we cannot derive any literals with a degree
different from 0 under cautious reasoning, while we do find
P |=bN
{
a1, b1
}
and P |=bΠ
{
a1, b1
}
. This corresponds exactly
with the brave/cautious conclusions that can be derived from
the classical program P = {a← not b; b← not a}. This re-
sult holds trivially for all PASP programs that only use
certainties c = 1. Indeed, all the subsets of P have a possibility
of 0, hence the only possible subset of P is P itself.
The new semantics overcome some of the problems inherent
in the semantics of [1] and adhere to a different intuition than
the semantics of [2]. One of the problems with [1] is that
the semantics do not behave intuitively when conclusions are
made through NAF. This is because the semantics rely on the
classical reduct and do not take the certainty of the literals
into account when dealing with NAF. For example:
0.1 : canceled← 1 : concert← not canceled.
This program intuitively states that we have a low certainty
that a concert is canceled and that the concert will only
take place if there is no indication that it is canceled. The
semantics from [1] give rise to the answer set
{
canceled0.1
}
,
i.e. they only state that the concert is canceled. The semantics
presented in this paper conclude
{
canceled0.1, concert0.9
}
,
i.e. the concert still takes place, though we are less certain of
our conclusion. This corresponds with the semantics from [2].
Nevertheless, the semantics from [2] follow a different intu-
ition. For example, the program with the rules
c : left ← not right c′ : right ← not left 1 : ← left , right
with c, c′ ∈ ]0, 1[ has no answer sets. Nevertheless, intuitively,
the program merely states that we need to choose either left or
right, i.e. an exclusive choice. This behavior can also be seen
in Pex from Section I where we need to choose either beach
or bbq, yet are unable to. The semantics from this paper are
able to make such an exclusive choice, as in the next example.
Example 4. Consider Pex from Section I. Under the semantics
proposed in this paper, we obtain:
Pex |=bΠ
{
rain1, beach0.8, bbq0.8
}
Pex |=bN
{
rain1, beach0.4, bbq0.2
}
Pex |=cΠ
{
rain0.2, beach0, bbq0
}
Pex |=cN
{
rain0.2, beach0, bbq0
}
Since the necessity associated with beach is always higher
than, or equal to, the necessity associated with bbq for all
reasoning tasks, we can conclude that we are more likely to
go to the beach than to have a barbecue.
We now give a more elaborate example to illustrate that the
semantics presented in this paper do not have the aforemen-
tioned issues, even if both are present at the same time.
Example 5. Triage at an accident site with a large number
of casualties is an essential part of medical treatment when
resources are limited. With the help of triage, it becomes
possible to distinguish which casualties can wait for medical
attention at a hospital and which casualties need to be treated
on the spot. For brevity of this example, we consider a
triage system with three levels. The casualty may have minor
injuries (minor), which means that the person can wait for
treatment at the hospital. The casualty may need to be treated
immediately because of life-threatening, yet treatable injuries
(nowait). The final category is beyond urgency (beyond) and
encompasses those casualties which are so severely injured
that, for the time being, medical attention is better directed
towards casualties in the nowait category as the chances of
survival of casualties in this latter category are far higher.
A rescue helper is faced with a casualty with extensive
external injuries (extensive), which indicates that he/she
either falls in the nowait or beyond category. The casualty
is faintly moaning (moaning), which, with a very low cer-
tainty, is an indication of the casualty still being conscious
(conscious). Similarly, the casualty is exhibiting a bleeding
nose (nosebleed), which might indicate internal bleeding
(internal). The rescue helper would be a lot more certain
that the casualty is experiencing internal bleeding when he/she
also had low blood pressure (lowblood), but this has not been
established. Whenever the casualty does not appear to be
conscious, he/she is assumed to be in the nowait or beyond
category. When there is no indication of internal bleeding, the
casualty is in the nowait category. A classification in one of
the categories is never entirely certain since it is not possible,
due to time constraints, to perform all the required tests. We
have the program with the rules:
1 : extensive←
0.9 :minor ← not extensive
1 :moaning ←
0.1 : conscious← moaning
0.9 : nowait← not beyond, not internal,
not conscious, extensive
0.9 : beyond← not nowait, not conscious, extensive
1 : nosebleed←
0.1 : internal← nosebleed
0.7 : internal← nosebleed, lowblood
1 : ← nowait, beyond, extensive
1 : ← not nowait, not beyond, extensive
The last two rules encode that one and exactly one of the cat-
egories needs to be chosen when the casualty has extensive in-
juries, a requirement for an efficient triage. Notice that at least
one rule needs to be omitted to make the program consistent.
Under the semantics of [1] and the semantics [2] we obtain no
answer sets. Indeed, the semantics of [1] are unable to take the
low certainty of the literal conscious into account when rea-
soning with NAF. The semantics of [2], on the other hand, are
unable to choose between nowait and beyond. Indeed, we will
obtain an infinite number of answer sets such that the sum of
the necessities of nowait and beyond equals 0.9 and such that
the necessity for both nowait and beyond will be higher or
equal to 0.1. Under the semantics proposed in this paper, how-
ever, we obtain that P |=bΠ
{
beyond0.9, nowait0.9
}
, P |=cΠ{
beyond0.9, nowait0.1
}
, P |=bN
{
beyond0.9, nowait0.1
}
and
P |=cN
{
beyond0.1, nowait0.1
}
. The new semantics are thus
capable of arriving at the desired conclusion. Indeed, since
the necessity associated with beyond is higher or equal to
the necessity associated with nowait for all reasoning tasks,
a reasonable classification for the casualty is beyond. This
corresponds with our intuition, as a number of indications hint
towards this worst case scenario (e.g. the bleeding nose). If
we added the fact that the casualty has low blood pressure,
then even a brave conclusion with possibility measures would
indicate that the casualty is beyond urgency, i.e. it would
further reaffirm our conclusion.
IV. COMPLEXITY RESULTS
We now analyze the complexity of the decision problems
associated with the inference types from Definition 2. More
specifically, we are interested in the complexity of determining
whether for some PASP program P and some literal l we
can bravely/cautiously derive that l is a conclusion of P with
a necessity/possibility degree of at least λ. Recall that the
complexity class ΣP2 , sometimes also written NP
NP, is the
class of problems that can be solved in polynomial time on
a non-deterministic machine with an NP oracle, i.e. assuming
access to a procedure that can solve NP problems in constant
time [11]. The complexity class ΠP2 contains those problems
whose complement is in ΣP2 , i.e. Π
P
2 = coΣ
P
2 [11]. Deciding
the validity of a Quantified Boolean Formula (QBF) φ =
∃X1∀X2 · p(X1, X2) with p(X1, X2) a formula in disjunctive
normal form (DNF) over the set of variables X1 ∪X2 is the
canonical ΣP2 -complete problem. Deciding the validity of a
QBF φ = ∀X1∃X2 ·p(X1, X2) with p(X1, X2) in conjunctive
normal form (CNF) is the canonical ΠP2 -complete problem.
Brave (resp. cautious) reasoning for normal programs is known
to be NP-complete (resp. coNP-complete) [6].
Proposition 1. Let P be a possibilistic normal program.
Deciding whether N (P |=c l) ≥ λ is in coNP.
Proof: We will show that the complementary problem is
in NP. To determine whether N (P |=c l) 6≥ λ we guess on the
one hand a subset P ′ of rules from P such that piP (P ′) > 1−λ
and on the other hand an interpretation M , which does not in-
clude ‘a’. Given such a non-deterministic guess, we can verify
in polynomial time that M is an answer set of P ′ and hence
that P ′ 6|=c a. From Definition 2 we know that N (P |=c l) =
1−max {piP (Q) | Q ⊆ P and Q∗ 6|=c a}≤ 1− piP (P ′) < λ.
In other words: determining whether N (P |=c l) 6≥ λ is in
NP. Deciding whether N (P |=c l) ≥ λ is thus in coNP.
Proposition 2. Let P be a possibilistic normal program.
Deciding whether N
(
P |=b l) ≥ λ is in ΠP2 .
Proof: We will show that the complementary problem is
in ΣP2 . To determine whether N
(
P |=b l) 6≥ λ we guess a sub-
set P ′ of rules from P such that piP (P ′) > 1− λ. Notice that,
contrary to Proposition 1, we cannot simply guess an inter-
pretation to verify that N
(
P |=b l) 6≥ λ. Indeed, determining
whether P ′ 6|=b a requires that there is not a single answer set
in which ‘a’ is not contained, whereas for determining whether
P ′ 6|=c a it suffices to find exactly one answer set in which ‘a’
is not contained. Therefore, given a non-deterministic guess
for P ′, we rely on an NP-oracle [6] to verify in constant
time that P ′ 6|=b a. Similar as in Proposition 1 this gives
us a counterexample for N
(
P |=b l) ≥ λ. Hence determining
whether N
(
P |=b l) ≥ λ is in co(NPNP), i.e. in ΠP2 .
Proposition 3. Let P be a possibilistic normal program.
Deciding whether Π (P |=c l) ≥ λ is in ΣP2 .
Proposition 4. Let P be a possibilistic normal program.
Deciding whether Π
(
P |=b l) ≥ λ is in NP.
The proofs of the last two propositions are entirely analogous
to the proofs of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2. Moreover, the
following hardness results are trivially carried over from the
hardness of brave and cautious reasoning in classical ASP [6]:
Proposition 5. Let P be a possibilistic normal program.
Deciding whether N (P |=c l) ≥ λ is coNP-hard (λ > 0).
Proposition 6. Let P be a possibilistic normal program.
Deciding whether Π
(
P |=b l) ≥ λ is NP-hard (λ > 0).
The next two results are more involved and require a simula-
tion of QBFs.
Definition 5. Let φ = ∃X1∀X2 · p(X1, X2) be a QBF such
that p(X1, X2) = θ1 ∨ ...∨ θn a formula in DNF with Xi sets
of variables. We define the possibilistic normal program Pφ
corresponding to φ as
Pφ = {0.5 : x← | x ∈ X1} ∪ {0.5 :¬x← | x ∈ X1} (1)
∪ {(1 : x← not ¬x), (1 :¬x← not x) | x ∈ X2} (2)
∪ {1 : sat← θt | 1 ≤ t ≤ n} (3)
where we identify the conjunction of literals θt in (3) with a
set of literals.
Example 6. Consider the QBF φ = ∃p1, p2∀q · (p1∧q)∨ (p2∧
¬q). The possibilistic normal program Pφ is then
0.5 : p1 ← 0.5 :¬p1 ←
0.5 : p2 ← 0.5 :¬p2 ←
1 : q ← not ¬q 1 :¬q ← not q
1 : sat← p1, q 1 : sat← p2,¬q
Proposition 7. Let P be a possibilistic normal program.
Deciding whether Π (P |=c l) ≥ λ is ΣP2 -hard (λ > 0).
Proof: We reduce the problem of determining the sat-
isfiability of a QBF of the form φ = ∃X1∀X2 · p(X1, X2)
with p(X1, X2) in DNF to the problem of deciding whether
Π (P |=c l) ≥ λ. Specifically, we use the possibilistic normal
program Pφ that simulates φ from Definition 5 and show that
the QBF is satisfiable if and only if Π (Pφ |=c sat) ≥ 0.5.
The rules in (1) ensure that there are at least as many
subprograms P ′ ⊆ Pφ as there are interpretations of X1. The
subprograms P ′ with piPφ(P
′) > 0 then contain the rules (2)
that generate as many answer sets as there are interpretations
of X2. The rule (3) ensures that ‘sat’ is contained in the
classical answer set whenever for a chosen interpretation of
X1 and X2 it holds that p(X1, X2) is satisfied. Notice that
the certainty attached to the rules ensures that removing
any of the rules from (2) or (3) results in piPφ(P
′) = 0,
i.e. it indicates that these rules are completely necessary.
We then have that Π (Pφ |=c sat) ≥ 0.5 if and only if the
QBF is satisfiable. Indeed, from the construction of Pφ we
know that every consistent interpretation of X1 will only
have a subset of the rules from (1) and, more specifically,
there will be a one-on-one relation between the consistent
interpretation of X1 and the subprograms with a possibility
of 0.5. Also, P ′∗ |=c sat if and only if P ′ corresponds to an
interpretation of X1 such that p(X1, X2) is satisfied for every
interpretation of X2. Using the possibility measure (i.e. finding
max
{
piPφ(P
′) | P ′ ⊆ Pφ and P ′∗ |=c sat
}
) implies that the
QBF is satisfied whenever we find at least one such an
interpretation X1.
Some of the subprograms of Pφ may correspond to partial
or inconsistent interpretations of X1. However, the subpro-
grams P ′ corresponding with inconsistent interpretations have
piPφ(P
′) = 0 by definition and can therefore never be used
to derive Π (Pφ |=c sat) ≥ 0.5. Furthermore, any subprogram
P ′ with incomplete assignments for the variables in X1 from
which we can conclude that P ′∗ |=c sat can trivially be
extended to a subprogram P ′′ to which we add some rules
from (1) to complete the assignment for the variables in X1
and we will still be able to conclude that P ′′∗ |=c sat. Thus,
these additional subprograms do not affect our ability to derive
Π (Pφ |=c sat) ≥ 0.5.
Proposition 8. Let P be a possibilistic normal program.
Deciding whether N
(
P |=b l) ≥ λ is ΠP2 -hard (λ > 0).
Proof: Let Q be the program defined as
P ∪ {1 : x← not l} with x a fresh literal. Then
N
(
Q∗ |=b l) ≥ λ if and only if Π (Q∗ |=c x) ≤ 1− λ.
Indeed, we know from Definition 2 that N
(
Q∗ |=b l) ≥ λ
whenever 1−max{piP (P ′) | P ′∗ 6|=b l} ≥ λ, i.e. whenever
max
{
piQ(P
′) | P ′ ⊆ Q and P ′∗ 6|=b l} ≤ 1− λ. Because
the newly added rule x← not l will be in every subprogram
P ′ with piQ(P ′) > 0 (since the certainty attached to this rule
is 1), we know that there is at least one answer set in which
l is true if and only if it is not the case that x is true in
every answer set. Thus, the previous inequality is equivalent
to max
{
piQ(P
′) | P ′ ⊆ Q and P ′∗ |=c x} ≤ 1 − λ and, by
applying Definition 2, to Π (Q∗ |=c x) ≤ 1− λ. Since the
set of certainty values associated with the rules is finite,
this equation is equivalent to Π (Q∗ |=c x) < λ′ for some
λ′. Hence ¬(Π (Q∗ |=c x) ≥ λ′). This problem is therefore
the complement of the decision problem from Proposition 7.
Thus deciding whether N
(
P |=b l) ≥ λ is ΠP2 -hard.
V. RELATED WORK
Combining logic and uncertainty in a single framework is
an active topic of research. For example, the work from [12]
on probabilistic logic is one of the first generalizations of
propositional logic to a logic that allows to associate proba-
bilistic values to formulas. The semantics are defined in terms
of probability distributions over possible worlds, where the
probability attached to a formula corresponds with the proba-
bility that the real world is among those possible worlds that
make the formula true. These ideas have later been extended
to probabilistic logic programming [13]. Similar work had
already been done in [14], which is one of the earliest works
to combine probability theory with non-monotononic negation
in the setting of probabilistic deductive databases.
Another popular approach for dealing with uncertainty are
Markov Logic Networks [15] which use Markov networks [16]
to compactly describe a probability distribution over possible
worlds. Other approaches include, for example, the work in
Bayesian Logic Programming [17], where a generalization
of Bayesian networks is used to reason over Horn clauses.
Specifically within the domain of ASP [5], we find the work
from [18], which combines ASP with probability theory [19].
Probabilistic atoms are used to encode uncertain information
which, intuitively, describes the probability that an associated
random variable will take on a given value.
Aside from probability theory, possibility theory [7] has also
been used by many authors for dealing with uncertainty in a
non-monotonic setting. The work in [20] combines defeasible
logic, a form of non-monotonic reasoning involving both strict
and defeasible rules, with possibility theory in a single frame-
work. This allows, among other things, to resolve conflicts
between contradictory goals. Possibility theory has also been
combined with argumentation frameworks, e.g. in [21], where
revision rules allow an agent to revise its beliefs and goals.
One of the earliest works that combines possibility theory
with stable models is [22], where a compositional version of
possibilistic logic is used as a logic of graded truth to deal with
uncertainty. More recently, [1] combined possibility theory
with ASP, resulting in the PASP framework. Recently, other
semantics for PASP have been envisaged, including [2] (as
discussed in Section II) and the work on pstable models [23],
[24], which is a framework based on the fusion of ASP
and paraconsistent logic. Such pstable models are closer to
possibilistic logic [10] and to the intuition of classical models,
rather than to the intuition of stable models as in our approach.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced new semantics for PASP based on the
idea that a PASP program P is an incomplete specification of
an ASP program. Every classical ASP program can be seen
as an encoding of the possible epistemic states of an agent.
The idea underlying the PASP semantics then boils down to
keeping the idea of answer sets as (Boolean) epistemic states,
but use the certainty degrees attached to the rules to express
that some epistemic states are more plausible than others. As
such we are able to construct a possibility distribution over
the universe of subsets of P . This gives rise to four distinct
types of inference. We have examined the complexity of these
inference types and showed that two of these types of inference
are no more complex than in classical ASP, whereas the others
are located one level higher in the polynomial hierarchy.
In future work, we want to extend our approach beyond
starting from the certainty of individual rules. Rather, we want
to start from a causal network, where we graphically model
the relations between rules, to be able to more precisely de-
scribe the uncertainty that the agent faces. Possibilistic causal
networks [25] are the possibilistic equivalent of Bayesian
probabilistic networks [26] and are an obvious candidate.
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